miércoles, 10 de septiembre de 2014
WOLA's Walsh Presents at the OAS on the Drug Problem in the Americas
OAS Policy Roundtable “Multisectoral Perspectives on the Drug Problem in the Americas” - September 8, 2014 from OAS/OEA TV on Vimeo.
On September 8, 2014, WOLA Senior Associate John Walsh joined OAS Secretary General José Miguel Insulza; Permanent Representative of Guatemala José María Argueta; Director of the Office of Policy and Legislation at the US Department of Justice Jonathan Wroblewski; Resident Magistrate of the Kingston Drug Treatment Court Stephane Jackson-Haisley; and President of Intercambios Asociación Civil Graciela Touzé to participate in an OAS Policy Roundtable on Multisectoral Perspectives on the Drug Problem in the Americas. Walsh (who begins speaking at 7:27) acknowledges that there exists a growing realization among both officials and reform advocates that current policies have not been effective.
To learn more about WOLA's work promoting drug policies that support human rights and protect public health, please click here.
Source: WOLA
On September 8, 2014, WOLA Senior Associate John Walsh joined OAS Secretary General José Miguel Insulza; Permanent Representative of Guatemala José María Argueta; Director of the Office of Policy and Legislation at the US Department of Justice Jonathan Wroblewski; Resident Magistrate of the Kingston Drug Treatment Court Stephane Jackson-Haisley; and President of Intercambios Asociación Civil Graciela Touzé to participate in an OAS Policy Roundtable on Multisectoral Perspectives on the Drug Problem in the Americas. Walsh (who begins speaking at 7:27) acknowledges that there exists a growing realization among both officials and reform advocates that current policies have not been effective.
To learn more about WOLA's work promoting drug policies that support human rights and protect public health, please click here.
Source: WOLA
Puerto Rico and Federal Status Legislation, 1952-2012
On November 6, the residents of Puerto Rico will have an opportunity to vote in local island-wide general elections and a status plebiscite. The 2012 plebiscite provides electors with a two-stage vote on the future status of the island. The first stage asks electors to choose between continuing the present Commonwealth or territorial status (Yes) and changing it (No). The second stage provides electors with a choice among three alternative status options, namely statehood, independence, and a non-territorial relationship described as a ‘Sovereign Free Associated State’ (http://www.ceepur.org/es-pr/Paginas/Plebiscito-2012.aspx). Like prior status laws enacted by the Puerto Rican legislature in 1993 and 1998, this plebiscite is not authorized by Congress and is non-binding on the Federal government.
The United States has governed Puerto Rico as an unincorporated territory for more than a century. Between 1898 and 1901, the United States created a new territorial status enabling the Federal government to selectively govern Puerto Rico as a foreign country for domestic or constitutional purposes. In 1950, Congress enabled Puerto Ricans to draft a local constitution and subsequently submit it to an island-wide referendum. In 1952, after a contentious parliamentary process, Puerto Ricans voted in favor of the new constitution and the establishment of a ‘Free Associated State,’ loosely translated as a Commonwealth. While the new constitution provided for greater local self-government and administrative autonomy, Congress unequivocally established that the new political arrangement did not change the territorial or constitutional status of Puerto Rico.
After 1952, Puerto Rican electors have gone to the polls on three occasions to vote in a status plebiscite. In 1967, Congress enacted Federal legislation authorizing the government of Puerto Rico to hold a plebiscite and enabled the island’s residents to choose among three status options, namely affirming the Commonwealth status, choosing statehood, and/or independence. A majority of electors voted to affirm the Commonwealth status (60.4%) over the statehood (39%) and independence (0.6%) options.[i] Puerto Rican lawmakers subsequently enacted legislation providing for two additional status plebiscites in 1993 and 1998 without congressional authorization. Although no status option garnered a clear majority of the votes in the 1993 plebiscite, the Commonwealth (48.6%) option received more votes than the statehood (46.3%) and the independence (4.4%) options. Subsequently the leadership of the Puerto Rican Popular Democratic Party (PPD) or the Commonwealth party capitalized on popular anger at the pro-Statehood government for wasting money on a plebiscite and organized a boycott of the 1998 plebiscite mobilizing voters to choose the ‘None of the above’ option. A combination of the PPD’s campaign and below average turnout enabled the “None of the above” option to get 50.3% of the vote effectively nullifying the outcome of the plebiscite
Simultaneously, since 1952 Federal lawmakers introduced, debated, and in some cases voted on, 68 additional status and plebiscitary bills.
Total Puerto Rico Federal Status and Plebicitary Legislation
Source: United States Congressional Record Index, Law Library of the Library of Congress
Source: United States Congressional Record Index, Law Library of the Library of Congress
It is important to note why the introduction of Federal status and plebiscitary bills peaked during the 1960’s and then again in the 1990’s. The bills debated during the 1960s mostly aimed at either affirming the 1950-1952 process or at negotiating different versions of the 1967 plebiscite. In contrast, lawmakers debated a substantive number of status and plebiscitary bills during the period of the late 1980’s and the decade of the 1990’s following international pressure from the United Nations’ Decolonization Committee to grant Puerto Rico the opportunity to engage in a process of political Self-Determination. Lawmakers across party and ideological lines introduced a wide array of plebiscitary bills including the infamous Johnston and Young Bills during this period in order to challenge status legislation pushing for the Self-Determination and independence of Puerto Rico.
Since 1952, Federal lawmakers have introduced a wide range of bills including: organic or territorial laws directly changing the status of the island; referendum legislation asking local residents to affirm or reject a status option; and plebiscites that provide electors with an opportunity to choose among multiple status options. A fraction (3 bills) of the legislation introduced in Congress opposed either a particular status option (Enhanced Commonwealth) or do not specify a status outcome.
Total Federal Legislation by Status Option (%)
Source: United States Congressional Record Index, Law Library of the Library of Congress
Source: United States Congressional Record Index, Law Library of the Library of Congress
The majority of Federal bills provided for one of three status options, namely statehood (27.9%), independence (22.1%) or a variance of territorial autonomy (Commonwealth) (11.8%). Statehood bills include legislation that: would ‘incorporate’ Puerto Rico and place it on a path to eventual statehood; enable the island to develop a state constitution as a precondition for admission into the Union; and in most cases simply providing for the admission of Puerto Rico as a state. Post-1952 independence legislation encompassed two types of bills, namely bills providing for the independence of the island and bills enabling Puerto Ricans to exercise a right to self-determination. Territorial autonomy bills include a wide range of statuses that affirm variations of the Commonwealth status, ranging from the affirmation of a ‘permanent union’ with the United States to a non-territorial or Enhanced Commonwealth option.
In contrast, almost two-thirds (38.2%) of all bills debated in Congress provided for a plebiscite enabling voters to choose one of the three status options (or a variant thereof). For example most of these plebiscites contain the typical option to choose both for independence or statehood, but included a variant of the Commonwealth status option that emphasized different degrees of autonomy or enhanced political powers.
The majority of the multiple option plebiscitary bills (25 out of 26) were introduced in the late 1990’s and after. In many ways, this trend reflects a lack of political consensus among Federal lawmakers stemming from the polemical Johnston and Young bills debated during the late 1980’s and early to mid 1990’s. It also reflected growing divisions between advocates of the traditional Commonwealth status and a growing desire by others to enhance the political powers of the Puerto Rican government while curtailing the plenary authority of Congress to administer the relationship between the Federal government and Puerto Rico.
In sum, while it may be difficult to predict the electoral outcome of the 2012 Puerto Rican status plebiscite, especially when the vote is being held along with the island-wide general elections, the legislative history of these debates suggests two possible outcomes in Congress. First, lawmakers are not likely to accept the outcomes of a status plebiscite that was not authorized by Congress. Second, the growing lack of consensus among federal lawmakers, a lack of consensus which can be traced back to the late 1980’s, is likely to result in a failure to support a status option other than the traditional Commonwealth.
[i] Electoral data for Puerto Rico is available at the Comisión Estatal de Elecciones, Estado Libre Asociado de Puerto Rico (http://www.ceepur.org/es-pr/Webmaster/Paginas/Eventos-Electorales.aspx).
Charles R. Venator-Santiago, PhD is Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Connecticut.
Yazmin A. Garcia Trejo is a doctoral student in the Department of Political Science at the University of Connecticut
The commentary of this article reflects the views of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of Latino Decisions. Latino Decisions and Pacific Market Research, LLC make no representations about the accuracy of the content of the article.
Source: Latino Decisions
The Rich Context of the 2012 Plebiscite on Puerto Rico’s Political Status
On November 6, 2012, the residents of Puerto Rico went to the polls to vote on both island-wide general elections and a local plebiscite on the territorial status of Puerto Rico. This election has generated a heated debate regarding the outcome and implications of the plebiscite vote. Central to this debate are three questions, namely: In what context was this plebiscite held? What was the actual outcome of the vote? And what are the implications of this plebiscite? This entry addresses the first question by providing an overview of the political context surrounding this important vote. Additional posts providing responses to the next two questions will be posted in a short series on this topic.
Contextualizing the 2012 Plebiscite
Advocates and critics alike invoke two arguments to contextualize the 2012 plebiscite. Members of the conservative and pro-statehood Partido Nuevo Progresista (PNP) (New Progressive Party) argue that the plebiscite granted the Puerto Rican electorate a democratic opportunity to rectify more than a century of colonial subordination. These pro-statehood advocates argue that the United States has governed Puerto Rico as a “colony” since 1898 and the 2012 plebiscite is an effort to rectify a century-old injustice. This plebiscite is a mere expression of the will of United States (U.S.) citizens residing in Puerto Rico who demand equal political and economic treatment. Critics across the ideological spectrum, including members of the autonomist Partido Popular Democratico (PPD) (Popular Democratic Party), generally counter that the plebiscite was a mere political ploy to mobilize the Puerto Rican electorate to vote on a straight-ticket for the pro-statehood candidates.
To understand the current debate regarding the plebiscite vote it is helpful to review the historical arguments from both sides of the issue.
The United States annexed Puerto Rico following the 1898 Spanish-American War and invented a new territorial status to rule the island without binding Congress to grant Puerto Rico statehood or to prevailing constitutional precedents. The U.S. military occupied Puerto Rico July 1898 and soon after, following the cessation of hostilities, established a two-year military dictatorship tasked with governing the island and developing colonial institutions. Scholars agree that Brigadier George Davis, the last military governor of the island, established the key public institutions modeled after the British notion of colonial “dominion.”
Modeled after the General Davis’ proposal, in 1900 Congress enacted the Foraker Act providing a civil or territorial government for the island. The Foraker Act created a new territorial status and a corresponding government. The Third Article established that the United States could selectively govern Puerto Rico as a foreign country for trade purposes or more specifically for the collection of taxes, duties, and other tariffs on merchandize trafficked between the island and the mainland. Unlike prior organic or territorial legislation, the Foraker Act did not extend the bill of rights to the island or provide for the collective naturalization of the residents of the Puerto Rico. Within a year the Supreme Court began to affirm the Foraker Act and the ensuing territorial status in a series of rulings known as the Insular Cases of 1901. Since then the U.S. has ruled Puerto Rico as an unincorporated territory enabling the Federal government to selectively rule the island as a foreign country in a domestic or constitutional sense.
In addition, the Foraker Act established the basic government institutions for Puerto Rico, some of which endure to the present. The Foraker Act granted the President a plenary power to appoint a local government and an Executive Committee tantamount to a second branch of Congress. Puerto Rican voters were allowed to elect representatives to a lower House of Delegates or Congress. The Act also continued maintained the Federal district court created by General Davis and subsequently integrated this bench to the 1st Circuit Court of Appeals. Moreover, although the Foraker Act created the office of the Resident Commissioner, this official would not gain access to Congress until 1902. Today the Puerto Rican Resident Commissioner is elected to a four-year term to the House of Representatives, and depending on the Congress, s/he may vote in congressional committees, but is generally barred from voting in the floor of the House.
Since then, Congress amended the Foraker Act on several occasions without changing the territorial status of Puerto Rico. In 1917 Congress enacted the Jones Act extending a bill of rights to Puerto Rico, providing for the collective naturalization of the island’s residents, and creating a popularly elected Senate. In 1947, Congress enacted legislation enabling the residents of Puerto Rico to elect a local governor. More importantly, in 1952 Congress approved a tempered Puerto Rican constitution granting administrative control over local affairs to a popularly elected government described as the Estado Libre Asociado (ELA) (loosely translated as Commonwealth). The remaining provisions of the Foraker Act not amended by prior legislation were essentially integrated into the 1950 Puerto Rican Federal Relations Act, the law regulating the relationship between the island and the Federal government. To this extent, advocates of the results of the 2012 status plebiscite argue that the United States has governed Puerto Rico as an unincorporated territory since 1898 and it is time to resolve the anomalous territorial status of the island, a status that subordinates U.S. citizens residing in Puerto Rico to a separate and unequal status within the United States polity.
The Partisan Context of the Plebiscite
In Puerto Rico, critics of the pro-statehood interpretation argue that the 2012 plebiscite was a mere partisan effort to draw reluctant voters to the polls in order to enlist a straight-ticket vote for PNP candidates. More specifically, they argue that during the past four years the PNP’s authoritarian rule has been riddled with corruption and failed public policies (crime and austerity measures), and that Governor Luis G. Fortuño could only win a second term in office by combining the general elections with the plebiscite in order to promote a pro-statehood straight-ticket voting. Critics further note that the PNP’s super-majority control of the legislature facilitated the enactment of the 2012 plebiscitary law.
While it is beyond the scope of this entry to disentangle the complex history of Puerto Rican political parties, suffice it to say that following the 1898 annexation local political parties generally gravitated towards three status options, namely autonomy, statehood, and independence. Spanish and Creole elites advocating for autonomy typically argued that Puerto Rico was too small to survive without the assistance of a bigger nation and argued for a permanent self-governing territorial status. Advocates of statehood typically invoked equal membership within the U.S. polity and the benefits of statehood. It is important to note that pre-1952 pro-statehood parties (and their splinters) spanned an ideological gamut including populist and elite conservatives, liberal progressives, and even socialists who saw the benefits of alliances with mainland labor unions. Like pro-statehood parties, the pro-independence parties included 19th century separatists, nationalists, splinter parties from the statehood and autonomic parties, socialists, and other pro-independence parties.
Following the enactment of the 1952 Commonwealth Constitution, the Puerto Rican political landscape began to gravitate towards a two-party system that typically split the majority of votes in both local elections and status plebiscites. Founded in 1938, the pro-Commonwealth Partido Popular Democratico advocates for territorial autonomy. However, advocates of territorial autonomy have argued for a range of relationships with the United States including an amended continuation of the Commonwealth status under the purview of Congress as well as enhanced forms of autonomy modeled after the Micronesian Compact of Free Association and governed by treaties under the purview of the President. Alternatively, founded in 1968, the Partido Nuevo Progresista advocates for statehood.
Notwithstanding the electoral dominance of the latter parties a range of smaller parties continue to struggle for about 6% of the general electoral vote. As of the time of this writing, it is possible to identify at least four alternative political parties embracing three distinct status options. Despite its poor electoral performance, the Partido Independentista Puertorriqueño (PIP) (Puerto Rican Independence Party) continues to garner between 2-3% of the electoral vote and advocates for a transitional independence from the United States. The Movimiento Unión Soberanista (MUS) (Movement for a Sovereign Union), a splinter party from the PPD, advocates for a Sovereign Free Associated State or a variant of the enhanced Commonwealth status. Two additional parties, the Partido del Pueblo Trabajador (PPT) (Puerto Rican Workers Party) and the Partido Puertorriqueños por Puerto Rico (PPR) (Puerto Ricans for Puerto Rico Party) have adopted a neutral stance on the status question while promoting social justice agendas in the island.
As previously noted, critics argue that the 2012 plebiscite was a mere instrument to mobilize electoral support for the PNP in order to counter the effects of the party’s unpopular political agenda and failed signature public policies. The PNP won an absolute majority in the 2008 general elections and soon after began to dismantle public and civil society sources of opposition. The government put forward a plan to pack the Supreme Court with pro-statehood judges and sought to redistrict the island’s congressional districts in order to reduce the number of legislative seats, a move that would have likely resulted in the permanent creation of a majority of PNP districts in the island. The government also sought to dismantle the University of Puerto Rico and the Puerto Rican Bar Association, two traditional hotbeds of civil society. Simultaneously, the PNP’s signature public policies failed. Austerity measures resulting in the massive firing of public employees (by some accounts upwards of 30,000) and the transfer of public resources to the pro-statehood friendly private sector exacerbated the local depression and failed to improve the economy. Governor Fortuño’s order-maintenance and “broken-windows” policies failed to reduce public violence and four years after his election crime is out of control in Puerto Rico. Finally, widespread clientelism, corruption, and public scandals threatened to discourage voters from either turning out to the polls or even voting for the statehood party in the 2012 island-wide general elections. Thus, in order to mobilize voters and hoping to benefit from straight-ticket voting, critics argue, the pro-statehood government scheduled 2012 plebiscite along with the general elections. The plebiscite vote was therefore central to many of the races on the 2012 ballot.
Controversies Associated With Plebiscite Votes and Statutes
As Yazmin Garcia-Trejo and I noted in our previous post, Federal lawmakers have debated upwards of 110 statutes and plebiscitary bills between 1900 and 2012. During the same period Congress has only authorized 1 status plebiscite for Puerto Rico. The 1967 plebiscite provided U.S. citizens residing in Puerto Rico with a choice among three status options, namely the Commonwealth territorial status, statehood, and/or independence. The Commonwealth option garnered a majority (60%) of the votes. It is important to note, however, that internal divisions within the statehood and independence parties hampered the performance of both parties in the plebiscite. In both instances, large numbers of members refused to vote in the plebiscite. In the case of the pro-statehood party, the Partido Estadista Republicano (PAR) (Republican Statehood Party), a faction led by Republican Luis A. Ferré subsequently formed the PNP in 1968 and at times used the plebiscite as a rallying cry to recruit more members to the party.
(Source: Comisión Estatal de Elecciones, Estado Libre Asociado de Puerto Rico)
Since then, the Puerto Rican legislature has enacted three laws
providing for local non-binding plebiscites in 1993, 1998, and 2012. In
all three instances, the pro-statehood PNP held a majority
control of the Governor and Resident Commissioner’s offices, both houses
of the local legislature, and mayoral offices throughout the island.
Like the 1967 Federal plebiscite, the 1993 law provided for three status
options and the Commonwealth option prevailed with nearly 48.6% of the
vote compared to 46.3% for the Statehood option (see Figure below). It
is important to note, however, that Roberto Sánchez Vilella, a former
pro-Commonwealth governor, and others successfully sued the governor
challenging the failure of the 1993 plebiscite to provide other
alternatives and definitions of the three traditional status options. In
Sánchez Vilella et al. v. ELA et al. [134 D.P.R. 503, 519-520
(1993)] the Puerto Rican Supreme Court affirmed the right of voters to
submit “blank” plebiscitary ballots as a form of protest. Stated
differently, the Puerto Rican Supreme Court unequivocally established
that blank ballots (not to be confused with a failure to vote) are a
legitimate and democratic form of civil disobedience or protest in
Puerto Rican electoral law.
(Source: Comisión Estatal de Elecciones, Estado Libre Asociado de Puerto Rico)
Unlike prior plebiscites, the 1998 ballot was mired in controversy
from the beginning. Puerto Rico had recently suffered vast destruction
at the hands of hurricane Georges and voters felt that a plebiscite
represented an unreasonable waste of public funds that could be better
spent in providing aid to victims of the hurricane. In addition, the
pro-statehood Governor Pedro Roselló was experiencing backlash from the
attempted sale of the Puerto Rican telephone company to a private
Spanish corporation and from wide spread corruption scandals within his
administration. Suffice to say that many (over 50% as indicated in
figure below) Puerto Rican voters boycotted the 1998 plebiscite by
filling out the so-called fifth option in the ballot or the “None of the
Above” option. This vote effectively nullified the 1998 plebiscite.
(Source: Comisión Estatal de Elecciones, Estado Libre Asociado de Puerto Rico)
Like prior plebiscites, the 2012 law was also mired in various controversies. Also known as the Democracy Act, early
versions of this plebiscite were introduced in the House of
Representatives between 2005 and 2008 by then Resident Commissioner
Fortuño. With the support of Representative José Serrano (D-NY),
Resident Commissioner Pierluisi was able to successfully shepherd the Democracy Act of 2010
through the House, but the bill lost traction in the Senate. In 2011,
the Puerto Rican legislature passed a revised version of the Democracy Act with strong objections from the pro-Commonwealth PPD leadership.
The leadership of the Puerto Rican Independence Party welcomed the
plebiscite with the understanding that the language of the law was
designed to fragment the Commonwealth option and favor statehood.
Members of the PIP believed that the U.S. Congress would
unilaterally reject any demands for statehood from Puerto Rico and thus
expose the Puerto Rican electorate to the political limits of the PNP. The 2012 plebiscite vote is full of controversy and in many ways reflective of the politics of Puerto Rico more broadly.Stay tuned for additional posts on this topic, including an interpretation of the results of the 2012 plebiscite vote that will be released later this week.
Charles R. Venator-Santiago is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science and the Institute for Latino/a, Caribbean and Latin American Studies at the University of Connecticut
The commentary of this article reflects the views of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of Latino Decisions. Latino Decisions and Pacific Market Research, LLC make no representations about the accuracy of the content of the article.
source: Latino Decisions
Secretario General Insulza disertó sobre los consensos previos a la Asamblea General Extraordinaria de la OEA sobre drogas
9 de septiembre de 2014 El Secretario General de la Organización de los Estados Americanos (OEA), José Miguel Insulza, aseguró hoy que existe consenso en la región acerca de la necesidad de avanzar conjuntamente en cuatro puntos en materia de drogas, que deben concretarse en la Asamblea General Extraordinaria que la Organización realizará en Guatemala el 19 de septiembre: incorporar al enfoque del tema de la droga el factor salud pública; buscar penas alternativas al encarcelamiento; no bajar la guardia frente al crimen organizado; y trabajar en el fortalecimiento institucional de la región.
El Secretario General Insulza fue el orador principal en una conversación convocada por el think tank de Estados Unidos, Diálogo Interamericano en Washington, DC, en la que habló sobre los desafíos en materia de estupefacientes en las Américas, a diez días de la Asamblea General Extraordinaria que tiene como tema central “Por una política hemisférica de drogas de cara al siglo XXI”, y cuyas conclusiones serán presentadas ante la Asamblea General de Naciones Unidas, que en 2016 centrará sus debates en el problema mundial de las drogas.
El líder de la institución hemisférica sostuvo que el debate de la política de drogas en la región se inició a partir del Informe elaborado por la OEA sobre el Problema de las Drogas en las Américas, dirigido por el propio Secretario General Insulza, y presentado en mayo de 2013 al Presidente colombiano Juan Manuel Santos. El reporte respondió a un mandato de la VI Cumbre de las Américas, celebrada en Cartagena, Colombia, en abril de 2012.
El máximo representante de la OEA afirmó que, 16 meses después de iniciado el debate, hay un acuerdo generalizado en el Hemisferio respecto a que el problema de las drogas es un asunto de salud pública, y no de seguridad pública, y recordó que ya nadie en la región habla de la “guerra contra las drogas”, en alusión a la política que siguió la región durante las últimas cuatro décadas.
El Secretario General de la OEA también indicó que la región coincide en la necesidad de solucionar el problema del hacinamiento en las cárceles, que está estrechamente relacionado con el consumo de estupefacientes. En este sentido, indicó que en las Américas hay 3.6 millones de presos, de los cuales “más de 1.5 millones están detenidos por problemas relacionados con las drogas, la mayoría de las veces por tenencia o consumo”. Insulza agregó que hay un creciente apoyo a adoptar medidas como penas alternativas, o la implementación de los Tribunales de Drogas, para infractores involucrados en delitos menores relacionados con las drogas.
En otro momento de su intervención, el Secretario General Insulza expresó que la nueva visión sobre las drogas en la región en ningún caso significa que se abandone la lucha contra las bandas del crimen organizado. Por el contrario, aseveró que “en esta área también existe consenso respecto a la necesidad de combatir a estos grupos que operan fuera de la ley”.
Respecto al fortalecimiento de las instituciones, el Secretario General de la OEA recordó que una de las conclusiones del Informe de la OEA sobre drogas es que “cuando hay menos institucionalidad hay más crimen”. En este sentido señaló que “hay países en los cuales el desborde de la institucionalidad es lo que produce un aumento de la criminalidad”, advirtiendo que cuando hay un vacío de autoridad, los grupos criminales suelen ocupar el lugar del Estado, “algo que debemos de evitar”, afirmó.
Fuente: OEA
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Por Philip Wallach
El 6 de noviembre de 2012, los electores en los estados de Washington y Colorado tomaron la trascendental y casi totalmente innovadora decisión de legalizar y regular el cannabis para uso recreacional. Aunque en muchos países se ha intentado aplicar formas de descriminalización o de uso médico legalizado del cannabis, ninguno se había aventurado a legalizar la producción, distribución y consumo recreacional de la droga, menos aún a erigir un sistema regulatorio integral y dirigido por el estado para supervisar el mercado. Pese a la falta de experiencia, y no obstante el claro conflicto con la ley federal sobre drogas, sólidas mayorías de votantes en Washington y Colorado decidieron que sus estados serían los pioneros de la experimentación. (En 2013, Uruguay les seguiría los pasos). La apertura de puntos de venta de cannabis legal se hizo realidad en Colorado desde enero de este año, y en Washington desde el 8 de julio pasado.
Mientras que Colorado viene capturando titulares por su rápido (y, en muchos aspectos, impresionante) despliegue de la legalización2, se puede afirmar que Washington está emprendiendo la reforma más radical y amplia. Esta reforma busca, en efecto, cambiar no solamente la manera en que el estado regula el cannabis, sino también desarrollar herramientas mediante las cuales se evalúen las reformas, y mostrar que dichas herramientas pueden ser relevantes en medio del tumultuoso debate político partidario. Washington ha lanzado dos iniciativas. Una de ellas se refiere a políticas sobre drogas; la otra trata del conocimiento. En el mundo de las políticas sobre drogas y, de hecho, en el mundo de la administración pública de modo más general, este enfoque es sumamente novedoso.
Esta segunda reforma, aunque menos pregonada que la legalización que domina los titulares, resulta de muchas maneras tan audaz como la primera. El gobierno del estado de Washington está tomando muy en serio su papel como laboratorio de la democracia, incrementando sus herramientas y dedicando recursos para dar seguimiento a su experimento de una manera inusualmente meticulosa. Varias características innovadoras resultan particularmente dignas de mención:
- Una porción de los ingresos generados por el tributo especial a la
venta de cannabis financiará investigaciones sobre los efectos de la
reforma y sobre cómo pueden mitigarse de manera efectiva sus costos
sociales. En efecto, el estado ha desarrollado mecanismos para evaluar
sus políticas de reforma desde el primer día, con un flujo de
financiamiento dedicado a financiar la continuidad e independencia
política del mecanismo.
- Las acciones de investigación están siendo coordinadas a través de
múltiples agencias estatales, incluyendo el Departamento de Servicios
Sociales y Sanitarios, el Departamento de Salud, y la Junta para el
Control de Licores (Liquor Control Board, LCB). En lugar de depender
únicamente de un punto de vista o fuente de información, el estado viene
enfocando muchas perspectivas para tratar de crear una evaluación
multifacética del tema.
- El Instituto de Políticas Públicas del Estado de Washington
(Washington State Institute for Public Policy, WSIPP), el centro de
estudios internos del estado, realizará un análisis de costo-beneficio
que virtualmente no tiene precedentes en cuanto a su ámbito y duración.
Si este estudio es ejecutado con éxito, brindará un parámetro de los
logros de la reforma, el cual puede ayudar a enfocar y regular el debate
político.
Al combinar estas técnicas, los gestores de políticas del estado de Washington buscan no sólo armarse de recursos para regular de manera proactiva el cannabis legal sino también para informar e influenciar de manera igualmente proactiva las batallas de información que rodearán al tema del cannabis legal. Esto no es poca cosa considerando que la regulación del cannabis es un debate político en la cual abundan los defensores apasionados y, a menudo, desmedidos. Mientras las líneas de batalla en la guerra de la información entre los defensores y detractores de la legalización se endurecen, los esfuerzos del estado por desarrollar conocimientos brindan a las autoridades la oportunidad de trascender los incansables ritmos del ciclo noticioso y de poner sus miras en horizontes temporales más relevantes. Los partidarios de la reforma a lo largo del país—en cuanto a políticas sobre cannabis, así como en otros campos—harían bien en aprender de este segundo experimento, tanto como del primero.Este documento describe los experimentos paralelos que tienen lugar en Washington: el experimento sobre el cannabis y el referido al conocimiento. El documento sopesará el potencial y los obstáculos del experimento estatal referido al conocimiento. Y ofrecerá algunas reflexiones sobre cómo aprovechar al máximo las innovaciones planteadas en Washington—tanto por quienes están más interesados en las políticas sobre drogas, como por aquellos que buscan mejorar la manera de realizar reformas de políticas de cualquier tipo.
Para bajar la introducción y resumen, haga clic aquí.
Para leer el informe completo (sólo en inglés), haga clic aquí.